Comments on: A Medieval Way of Talking about the Past and Future http://tiestin.wordpress.com/2008/03/08/a-medieval-way-oftalking-about-the-past-and-future/ what it is Fri, 19 Dec 2008 05:19:05 +0000 http://wordpress.com/ hourly 1 By: daviskuykendall http://tiestin.wordpress.com/2008/03/08/a-medieval-way-oftalking-about-the-past-and-future/#comment-11 daviskuykendall Sat, 08 Mar 2008 16:25:41 +0000 http://tiestin.wordpress.com/2008/03/08/a-medieval-way-oftalking-about-the-past-and-future/#comment-11 Hmm. Perhaps I phrased it wrong. Given a distinction between being in the sense that 1) Socrates is a being, which I take to be a substance and 2) Socrates being/existence (thatness), we know Socrates immediately in sense 1), and Socrates existence (as opposed to his essence) as the the result of a judgment. With sense 1) corresponding to the first act of the intellect and sense 2) corresponding to the second, I think it makes sense. I think Gilson was talking about sense 1) btw in talking about the order of knowing. Hmm. Perhaps I phrased it wrong. Given a distinction between being in the sense that 1) Socrates is a being, which I take to be a substance and 2) Socrates being/existence (thatness), we know Socrates immediately in sense 1), and Socrates existence (as opposed to his essence) as the the result of a judgment. With sense 1) corresponding to the first act of the intellect and sense 2) corresponding to the second, I think it makes sense. I think Gilson was talking about sense 1) btw in talking about the order of knowing.

]]> By: daviskuykendall http://tiestin.wordpress.com/2008/03/08/a-medieval-way-oftalking-about-the-past-and-future/#comment-12 daviskuykendall Sat, 08 Mar 2008 16:24:51 +0000 http://tiestin.wordpress.com/2008/03/08/a-medieval-way-oftalking-about-the-past-and-future/#comment-12 Hmm. Perhaps I phrased it wrong. Given a distinction between being in the sense that 1) Socrates is a being, which I take to be a substance and 2) Socrates being/existence (thatness), we know Socrates immediately in sense 1), and Socrates existence (as opposed to his essence) as the the result of a judgment. With sense 1) corresponding to the first act of the intellect and sense 2) corresponding to the second, I think it makes sense. I think Gilson was talking about sense 1) btw in talking about the order of knowing. Hmm. Perhaps I phrased it wrong. Given a distinction between being in the sense that 1) Socrates is a being, which I take to be a substance and 2) Socrates being/existence (thatness), we know Socrates immediately in sense 1), and Socrates existence (as opposed to his essence) as the the result of a judgment. With sense 1) corresponding to the first act of the intellect and sense 2) corresponding to the second, I think it makes sense. I think Gilson was talking about sense 1) btw in talking about the order of knowing.

]]> By: brandondahm http://tiestin.wordpress.com/2008/03/08/a-medieval-way-oftalking-about-the-past-and-future/#comment-10 brandondahm Sat, 08 Mar 2008 16:17:10 +0000 http://tiestin.wordpress.com/2008/03/08/a-medieval-way-oftalking-about-the-past-and-future/#comment-10 I think that makes sense. The comment about a concept being a nominalized way of talking about an action is sweet and helpful. One more question. In what order are we talking about "Socrates" being known immediately and Socrates being mediated by inference? If it is in the order of knowing, this seems to go directly against Gilson's thesis in Methodical Realism. Cheers. I think that makes sense. The comment about a concept being a nominalized way of talking about an action is sweet and helpful.

One more question. In what order are we talking about “Socrates” being known immediately and Socrates being mediated by inference? If it is in the order of knowing, this seems to go directly against Gilson’s thesis in Methodical Realism.

Cheers.

]]> By: daviskuykendall http://tiestin.wordpress.com/2008/03/08/a-medieval-way-oftalking-about-the-past-and-future/#comment-9 daviskuykendall Sat, 08 Mar 2008 14:59:45 +0000 http://tiestin.wordpress.com/2008/03/08/a-medieval-way-oftalking-about-the-past-and-future/#comment-9 Hi Brandon, I guess I should have clarified on what I mean by inference. By inference, I first off meant not immediately- the word Socrates is what is known immediately, and then Socrates himself is what is inferred from the word. This in contrast to the concept Socrates- in which case Socrates himself (or his nature) is what is known immediately- b/c the concept Socrates is actually a nominalized way of talkng about an action on part of the mind. Just like if I were to touch a wall, my finger would really be touching (verb) the wall, but I could talk about 'the touch' (noun) in an intelligible manner. But back to the issue of Socrates being known by inference from the word 'Socrates'. I guess, using the hand touching a wall analogy, if I were holding a stick, and touched the wall with the stick, I would know the wall by inference to the stick. I know immediately the stick, and inferentially the wall- I infer the wall from what I feel in the stick. Does that make sense? As to Socrates individuality- I can have in mind his accidents when conceiving his nature. I guess, with nods to Aquinas's De Ente Et Essentia, that the way I conceive his essence is from what I know of his accidents. I can't recall the exact passage at this point however... I learn of Socrates accidents from reading about him. Granted- he's obviously (at least with a thomistic metaphysic) individuated by his matter (metaphysically), but I suppose I can know his individuality via his accidents (epistemologically) as well as his nature. Hi Brandon,
I guess I should have clarified on what I mean by inference. By inference, I first off meant not immediately- the word Socrates is what is known immediately, and then Socrates himself is what is inferred from the word. This in contrast to the concept Socrates- in which case Socrates himself (or his nature) is what is known immediately- b/c the concept Socrates is actually a nominalized way of talkng about an action on part of the mind. Just like if I were to touch a wall, my finger would really be touching (verb) the wall, but I could talk about ‘the touch’ (noun) in an intelligible manner.

But back to the issue of Socrates being known by inference from the word ‘Socrates’. I guess, using the hand touching a wall analogy, if I were holding a stick, and touched the wall with the stick, I would know the wall by inference to the stick. I know immediately the stick, and inferentially the wall- I infer the wall from what I feel in the stick. Does that make sense?

As to Socrates individuality- I can have in mind his accidents when conceiving his nature. I guess, with nods to Aquinas’s De Ente Et Essentia, that the way I conceive his essence is from what I know of his accidents. I can’t recall the exact passage at this point however… I learn of Socrates accidents from reading about him. Granted- he’s obviously (at least with a thomistic metaphysic) individuated by his matter (metaphysically), but I suppose I can know his individuality via his accidents (epistemologically) as well as his nature.

]]> By: brandondahm http://tiestin.wordpress.com/2008/03/08/a-medieval-way-oftalking-about-the-past-and-future/#comment-8 brandondahm Sat, 08 Mar 2008 14:33:03 +0000 http://tiestin.wordpress.com/2008/03/08/a-medieval-way-oftalking-about-the-past-and-future/#comment-8 Hey Davis, I have a couple of questions: "The sign “Socrates” is an id quod- that which is known (in the nominative or accusative case). My mind is directed to Socrates form the word ‘Socrates’ by inference." What do you mean by inference here? And "Yet both the conventional sign and the concept serve the same purpose- they direct the mind to Socrates essence or nature, just in a different manner...But back to the question- what is being signified? I suppose Socrates essence can be signified- if not exhaustively, at least adequately." It seems like it is more than 'rational animal' being signified by 'Socrates.' Where does the individuality come in? Cheers. Hey Davis, I have a couple of questions:

“The sign “Socrates” is an id quod- that which is known (in the nominative or accusative case). My mind is directed to Socrates form the word ‘Socrates’ by inference.”

What do you mean by inference here?

And

“Yet both the conventional sign and the concept serve the same purpose- they direct the mind to Socrates essence or nature, just in a different manner…But back to the question- what is being signified? I suppose Socrates essence can be signified- if not exhaustively, at least adequately.”

It seems like it is more than ‘rational animal’ being signified by ‘Socrates.’ Where does the individuality come in?

Cheers.

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