One issue important to both the philosophy of language and the philosophy of time is how statements made about the past and future can be meaningful.  Some philosophers of time, such as Quentin Smith, claim that a referential theory of meaning requires the existence of past and future things in order for statements about them to be meaningful.  This poses a problem for Presentists, as only the present exists simpliciter, making it difficult to explain how statements about the past and future can be meaningful if meaning is somehow connected to reference.

A related issue pertaining to statements made about the past and future concerns the truth-makers of those statements.  What is the truth-maker for the statement “Socrates was put to death in Athens.”  Is the truth-maker found in the presently existing world- such as Socrates bones?  Is it not directly Socrates, but writings about him?  Again, Eternalists can claim that if the fact that Socrates drinks hemlock at a time earlier than the present is still a time that exists simpliciter,  then the truth-maker for the statement can be just that- Socrates drinking hemlock.  Presentists do not have that option, but they can and have appealed to states-of-affairs (Alvin Plantinga, William Lane Craig), such as the present state-of-affair that Socrates drank hemlock in Athens.

Interestingly, some Medieval philosophers had a little to say about these issues, albeit not to the depth that contemporary philosophers of time have.  In this blog entry, I attempt to present a way to think about how statements about the past and future can be meaningful via a Medieval approach.  I confess, however, that I’m still combing through medieval texts to address this, so for the time being I rely on the 20^th century Thomist Henry Veatch’s Intentional Logic to look into this issue.

Some aspects of Veatch’s approach to start us off then:

• i. There is a distinction between the signification of a term and the designation of the existence of the thing signified by the term.
  • a. A term alone does not designate existence.  A term does so only when placed in a proposition.
• ii. Concepts/terms acquire the property of designation when they enter into a proposition
• • a. The concept of Socrates has no designation as such.
  • b. The concept of Socrates has designation in the proposition “Socrates drank hemlock in Athens”
• iii. Subjects and predicates in propositions can have different significations, but they designate the same thing in a proposition
• iv. Extension is not the same thing as designation
  • a. The extension of a term is potentially designable
    • i. The term “Rock” has quite a bit in its extension.
    • ii. The term “Rock” designates as existing a particular rock in the proposition “The rock that destroyed my windshield”
• v. Concepts signify natures and essences
• vi. Concepts in propositions designate certain things as being or existing

Now on to the question of the meaningfulness of statements about the past and future.  Take the statement “Socrates is drinking hemlock in Athens.”

This statement is obviously false.  Is it false because of the predicate?  Veatch would argue that it is not.  Instead it’s false due to the copula.  In the above proposition, the predicate pertains to the subject, that is “drinking hemlock in Athens” pertains to “Socrates.”  The copula, “is”, is what renders the statement false.  Change the copula to “was,” and you have a true statement.  A different sort of existence is supposed in the copula “is” than the kind supposed in “was.”  So it’s not a failure of predication- it’s a failue of designation.   

Does this settle the issue?  Not yet.

First, one of McTaggart’s arguments against the reality of the A series of time assumed that tense was in the copula.  McTaggart claimed that times in an A series would have the contradictory positions of past, present, and future simultaneously.  C.D. Broad, in Ostensible Temporality, argued that if tense is found in the predicate instead of the copula, the issue dissolves.   I need to show how Veatch’s response can avoid this difficulty.  I hope to be able to do so in the future.

Second, how can one signify an essence that doesn’t exist?  There is a difference between signifying Santa Claus and signifying Socrates.  Santa Claus is a figment of my imagination.  Socrates is not.  Granted that signification is not the same thing as designating existence, relying on the Thomistic distinction between essence and existence.  As such, I think this issue is not difficult to address. 

I don’t have a complete answer, but I have something to offer.  First off, to signify is merely to direct the mind to something else.  For instance, smoke directs the mind to fire.  The sign ‘Socrates’ directs the mind to Socrates essence, or perhaps what one knows about Socrates.  Second, a concept, which is what is signified by the spoken or written term, also signifies Socrates, but in a different manner.  The sign “Socrates” is an id quod- that which is known (in the nominative or accusative case).  My mind is directed to Socrates form the word ‘Socrates’ by inference.  The concept of Socrates is an id quo – that by which something is known (in the ablative case.)  My mind is directed to Socrates not by inference from the concept, by means of the concept.  In fact, what I’m really doing is conceiving Socrates.  Yet both the conventional sign and the concept serve the same purpose- they direct the mind to Socrates essence or nature, just in a different manner.

Further, concepts are what is dealt with in the first operation of the intellect in Aquinas’s or Aristotle’s psychology.  They don’t require the actual existence of what is signified or conceived at this point.  When they enter into propositions- the second operation- they designate existence.  Designating existence is what gives them a truth-value.  I have the concept red, and another concept dog.  My mind judges that the dog is red.  I’m not positing existence with the concept dog alone, only when I predicate red of the dog.   

But back to the question- what is being signified?  I suppose Socrates essence can be signified- if not exhaustively, at least adequately.  When I read about Socrates, I gain knowledge about his essence via his accidents- including his actions, words, place, physical features, etc.  Albeit, all this is through texts I’ve read, but I’m still gaining knowledge about him.  I can also signify my great-grandmother’s essence adequately, perhaps moreso because I have stronger memories of her.  I’ve experienced her directly. 

 So when I say “Socrates drank hemlock,” Socrates does not need to exist to be signified.  The statement is also not designating Socrates as existing.  In which case, the statement is meaningful, and true.