Hans Georg Gadamer describes the hindrance that prejudices make on our ability to interpret a text in his major work, Truth and Method. While I have a certain set of problems with his overall program and many of his conclusions, I do think he has some insight into the notion of charity (though I don’t think he ever uses that term). The principle of charity basically claims that we should interpret someone in a favorable light, i.e., we assume that they have some intelligence.
Gadamer refers to this concept in his writings as the anticipation of completeness. Gadamer claims that people will always project their prejudices onto a text in the process of interpretation. One’s prejudices will obscure their ability to interpret the text in an objective way, which he has Schleiermacher, Dilthey, and others in mind here. How do we get around this seemingly inescapable pattern of projection, prejudices, and failed interpretations? Gadamer claims that in order to expose our prejudices, we must assume the text is complete and true. He is not claiming that the text is actually true and complete. One might discover that the text is false and incomplete. This is merely an assumption that needs to be made while interpreting the text. Gadamer writes: “The fore-conception of completeness that guides all our understanding is, then, always determined by the specific content. Not only does the reader assume an immanent unity of meaning, but his understanding is likewise guided by the constant transcendent expectations of meaning that proceed from the relation to the truth of what is being said” (Truth and Method, 294). The danger that Gadamer is trying to avoid is criticizing the text prematurely, before one understands it. Philosophers will often assume they know where the author is headed and allow their assumptions [and prejudices] to dictate the rest of the interpretation. The interpretation will then be tainted by false projections, and the interpreter’s prejudices will remain hidden in his or her mind. Assuming the completeness of the text forces the interpreter to suspend his or her prejudices from hindering understanding. As one reads the text, one’s prejudices interact with the text within the hermeneutical circle. This interaction causes the prejudices to be realized, and some of them will be eliminated in the process. Productive prejudices and non-productive prejudices will be separated from each other in the midst of the process of understanding. No method exists for separating good from bad prejudices; one must project one’s prejudices so the circle can sort out the prejudices. Gadamer writes: “The prejudices and fore-meanings that occupy the interpreter’s consciousness are not at his free disposal. He cannot separate in advance the productive prejudices that enable understanding from the prejudices that hinder it and lead to misunderstandings” (Truth and Method, 294). Gadamer affirms that the separation only occurs in the process of understanding. One cannot see one’s own prejudices until the text exposes them. The interpreter must assume the truth and completeness of the text in order to accomplish the task of understanding without hindrances. This paragraph summarizes Gadamer’s basic position [albeit somewhat crudely].
Admittedly, I have some major concerns with much of what Gadamer writes in his book. However, I really like what he has done here. Too many times I have prematurely judged an author before I really understood what he or she was saying [e.g. Gadamer]. As philosophers or thinkers, we ought to grant readings of others with as much charity as is permitted by the text. Most philosophers [especially the big names] have something to teach us, and we have to approach them with that attitude. I still vividly remember the words of Dr. Norman Geisler [from a class]: “In order to earn the right to criticize someone else you must (A) understand them and (B) learn something from them. ONLY then have you earned the right to criticize.” Too often we skip these steps and assume that the text is incomplete and false from the beginning. The sad thing is that we miss out on a lot of wonderful details because we launch straight into the destruction of the other’s “system.” In Plato’s Theaetetus, Socrates says, “For this is an experience which is characteristic of a philosopher, this wondering: this is where philosophy begins and nowhere else” (155d). Perhaps my mind is too simplistic on this point, but I think philosophy still ought to begin with wonder, and yet today it often begins with contention and destruction. The crux of the matter is philosophy ought to begin with questions and wondering about things, not criticism. Criticism should be a secondary consideration after understanding.
I’m looking forward to the meat and potatoes of this blog.
I hope you’re not disappointed, Joel.
It’s like the golden rule–for hermeneutics. That’s something I was taught in Glenn’s classes–charitable interpretation. Not just fair, but charitable–giving benefit of the doubt. It seems the way that Socrates went about. He always assumed his interlocutor had something to say and through questions he brought it out from them. Even when there were flaws, he assumed “you must not mean that.”
Good post. I like the part about philosophy asking questions. Philosophy shouldn’t be a pissing contest, even though it sometimes seems that way. If it’s the pursuit of truth, then that requires asking questions.
I guess one concern I have is this: can we really escape our prejudices? Ideally it makes sense that we can “charitably” read a text, but is our “charitable” reading completely free from prejudice? Is it not our societal position, our upbringing, our present understanding of a field, among other unchangeable things which causes our prejudices? If we cannot escape our prejudices, is Gadamer’s call for us to simply name as many as we can for others to understand us as we respond to a text?
Mr. Blondehead [this name is from my favorite tv show and it seems that it can apply to you].
This issue is where Gadamer and I part company. He does not believe that there can ever be presuppositionless interpretation, which I partially believe. Gadamer maintains that allowing your prejudices full-play in the interpretive process will expose them and then you can eventually reject the ones that hinder interpretation. And yes, Gadamer’s view is that we have to try to expose as many as we can, and somehow we can yield good interpretations from this method. Gadamer does not, however, support the notion of objectivity in interpretation.
But I, on the other hand, think it quite curious that bad prejudices could ever yield good interpretations. If one’s starting point is misguided, then how can one’s interpretation be good? One way to avoid this dilemma is to allow the notion that maybe not all prejudices [or presuppositions] are in fact bad. For example, the Law of Non-Contradiction [it looks more authoritative when capitalized] is certainly a “necessary” presupposition for all thought, in my view. These types of laws, for Aristotle and Aquinas, are considered to be the first principles of study [and each field will have its own first principles]. First principles, for those who hold to them, are self-evident and undeniable; and they are necessary as a starting point.
I do think that Gadamer has given us some insight into recognizing our psychological prejudices against certain authors or systems. For example, in philosophy, people often assume they know where the author is going and then they quit reading. Sometimes they might actually be right. However, just because we believe Kant is an idealist, it does not follow that we understand everything about him because we have read some other idealists. This is where i believe that Gadamer has helped us in the field of hermeneutics. If we try to understand how someone’s view could be right, then we are better equipped to understand them.
hope that makes things more clearer.
It seems to me that assuming the text to be true is one of the surest paths towards projecting one’s own ideas onto the text. (This creates a problem when the text is one, like Scripture, that in fact we know to be true. There, I guess, we really need grace and the Church.) Let’s say I read Aristotle. He seems to be saying something sexist and false (e.g., that the virtues proper to women are of lesser value than the virtues proper to men). Since I am reading him under the assumption that what he says is true, I will then opt for some reinterpretation that makes him out to be saying something true (maybe he is only saying that the virtues proper to women are of lesser instrumental value in his culture). But this reinterpretation, quite likely, is wrong (in this example it surely it is) and so I am a bad interpreter. If I allowed the possibility that Aristotle is sometimes wrong, I wouldn’t have made this mistake. One might think this problem comes only when I import my own beliefs. Well, I can’t really not do that. But suppose I could. Reading the text as if it were true will force me to reconcile inconsistencies. But what if the text is in fact inconsistent as written? Then I will again opt for implausible reinterpretations.
I wonder if a good way to read a non-sacred text might not be the following. Read it once assuming it’s all true. Read it again assuming it is totally wrongheaded but wrongheaded in an interesting way. Then read it a third time, open to learning from the text the extent to which the text is true or false.
Assuming the text to be true does not mean that it is actually true. This is just a way to hold back one’s knee jerk reactions against it. I think this is all I take from Gadamer’s ideas on this topic, even though he arguably might mean more than this. In other words, the anticipation of completeness is trying to see things from another’s perspective and trying to understand how what they are saying “could” be true. But it is not assuming that it is literally true.